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The Search for Clarity in the Accounting for Loan-Loss Reserves:
Earnings Management vs. Safety and Soundness
I. INTRODUCTION
The banking industry is viewed from many differing per-
spectives.1 Customers view banks as a safe place for deposits and a
source of loans.' Shareholders consider banks a means of obtain-
ing profit.3  Regulators view banking as "the backbone of our
economy, the vehicle through which the Federal Reserve applies
its monetary policy."' 4 The credence given these varying perspec-
tives changes with time; in the years after the Great Depression
banking regulation focused "on the safety and soundness of the
system.",5 Since the 1970s, however, regulatory emphasis reveals a
change in focus from safety and soundness to investors' interests.6
Recently, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) demon-
strated this shift by accusing banks of using their loan-loss reserve
accounts to "manage" earnings, making it difficult for investors to
uncover accurate information from banks' reported earnings data.'
1. Robert A. Bennett, Point of View; Logical But Dangerous, U.S. BANKER,





6. Bennett, supra note 1, at 8.
7. Steve Burkholder, Accounting: Banks' Loan Loss Reserves Focus For Rule-
makers, SEC StaffAt Conference, BNA BANKING DAILY, Nov. 3, 2000, at d4 [herein-
after Burkholder, Loan Loss Reserves]. In a pivotal 1998 speech that launched the
SEC's widespread effort to reduce earnings management, commission Chairman Ar-
thur Levitt referred to loan-loss allowances as "cookie jar reserves" used by compa-
nies to smooth earnings. Id. Earnings management is "the strategic exercise of
managerial discretion in influencing the earnings figure reported to external audi-
ences." Francois Degeorge, Jayendu Patel & Richard Zeckhauser, Earnings Man-
agement To Exceed Thresholds, J. oF Bus., Jan. 1999, at 2. Speaking at a November
2, 2000 conference for accountants and bankers in Washington, D.C., Mark Sever,
the new chairman of the Accounting Standards Executive Committee (AcSec), com-
mented that loan-losses appeared too "skinny" in years past. Burkholder, supra.
1
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The SEC argues that banks should not use these accounts as
"cookie jar reserves" to be raided in hard times to maintain the
appearance of smooth earnings.8
However, the banks and banking regulators, including the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve
Board, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency, and the Office
of Thrift Supervision, strongly support the notion that banks
should freely put aside reserves to cushion against bad loans.9 In
fact, banking regulators have been encouraging banks to increase
reserves to protect themselves from a potential downturn in the
U.S. economy."0 They maintain that there should be no require-
ment for these reserves to be tied to specific problem loans."
Banks want to prepare for the unanticipated losses inherent in the
loan making business. The banking agencies' desire for safe and
sound guarding against bad loans conflicts with the SEC's push for
adequate disclosure.
13
This Note will briefly recount the history of the loan-loss
debate.1 4 A key focus of this Note is the current debate over a still
evolving American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) proposal on the recommended accounting for loan-loss
reserves. 5 This Note will next examine the arguments of the SEC
This label was meant to suggest that reserves were insufficient to cover troubled
loans. Id. "The concern now is that allowances are too fat," stated Sever, referring
to the SEC's allegations of earnings management. Id.
8. Id. See also The Numbers Game, CPA J., Dec 1998, at 16 [speech by Arthur
Levitt at the NYU Center For Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998)].
9. Bennett, supra note 1, at 8.
10. Carey Gillam & Jaret Seiberg, SunTrust Yields In Tug-of-War With SEC
Over Loss Reserves, AM. BANKER, Nov. 16, 1998, at 1. Adding to loan-loss reserve
accounts usually involves a debit to a bank's "loan-loss provision" account, which
lowers net income, and a credit to the loan assets account, shown as an offset to gross
loans and labeled "loan-loss reserve." Viewpoints: Ludwig Sounds False Alarm
About Loan-Loss Proposal, AM. BANKER, Dec. 29,2000, at 11.
11. Bennett, supra note 1, at 8.
12. Dean Anason, In Brief- Greenspan Criticizes Loan-Loss Proposal, AM.
BANKER, Jul. 26,2000, at 4.
13. Gillam, supra note 10, at 5. "There is a direct conflict in the approaches of
the SEC and the bank agencies." Id. (quoting Richard Whiting, general counsel at
the Bankers Roundtable). "The SEC wants disclosure and the banking agencies
want safety and soundness." Id.
14. See infra notes 21-40 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 41-64 and accompanying text.
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and accounting regulators 16 versus those of the banks and the
banking regulators. 7 The Note will then discuss the controversial
element of subjectivity in setting loan-loss reserves.1 8 This discus-
sion is followed by political and public policy reaction to the loan-
loss reserve debate.19 The Note concludes with possible means of
compromise and a discussion on the effect of fair value accounting
on loan-loss reserve accounting."
II. HISTORICAL AccouNT OF LOAN-LOSS RESERVES
The debate over proper accounting for loan-loss reserves is
not a recent phenomenon.2' In December 1993, hoping to end
years of confusion, bank and thrift regulators agreed on a guide-
line formula for setting loan-loss reserves.22 The new policy was
intended to end the battle between bankers and examiners over
16. See infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 78-90 and accompanying text. Keith Newton, a partner at the
accounting firm Grant Thorton LLP, calls the debate over loan-loss reserve account-
ing "a lose-lose situation for the industry." Gillam, supra note 10, at 5. "On the one
hand you have accounting rules that say you cannot recognize losses until they occur.
But then you have regulators who are saying that times are not going to be as good so
you need to start recognizing that in your loan losses. This is a catch twenty-two."
Id.
18. See infra notes 91-108 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 109-120 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 121-137 and accompanying text. Fair value accounting would
require a valuation of assets according to their current market value rather than by
their original cost. Paul M. Sherer, Value Judgment: New Rules May Roil Banks,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2000, at C1.
21. See Barbara A. Rehm, Bank, Thrift Regulators Reach Accord on Formula For
Loan-Loss Reserves, AM. BANKER, Dec. 22, 1993, at 3.
22. Id. The formula advised "examiners to calculate reserves against the sum of:
50% of the portfolio classified as 'doubtful,' 15% of the portfolio classified as 'sub-
standard,' [a]nd estimated credit losses for the next year on unclassified portions of
the portfolio." Id. The policy statement also contained factors to consider when set-
ting loan-loss reserves beyond past loss experience. Id. These factors include
"changes in lending policies and procedures, including underwriting standards and
collection, chargeoff, and recovery practices;" "national and local economic and
business conditions;" "[t]he nature and volume of the institution's portfolio;" "[t]he
experience, ability and depth of lending management and staff;" "[t]he trend of the
volume and severity of the nonperforming loans;" "[t]he quality of the institution's
loan-review system;" "and the degree of oversight by the institution's directors." Id.
Other variables to consider include "the existence and effect of any concentrations of
credit and changes in those concentrations" as well as "external factors, such as com-
petition and legal or regulatory requirements." Id.
2001]
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proper accounting methods for loan-loss reserves. 23 However, in
1994, after a congressional study found banks' methods for estab-
lishing reserves to be inadequate, the General Accounting Office
(GAO) advised the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) and banking regulators to develop a common approach
for establishing loan-loss reserves.24 The GAO maintained that
banks should analyze large loans individually, reserving just
enough to cover likely losses.2 1 The GAO also stated that reserves
should be established based on current loss exposure in banks'
loan portfolios.
26
In 1998, the SEC began an investigation into the accounting
practices at SunTrust Banks Inc. 7 The SEC was concerned about
excessively high loan-loss reserves which enabled SunTrust to cre-
ate the impression of smooth earnings. 8 The SEC prevented a
merger between SunTrust and Crestar Financial Corporation by
refusing to sign off on proxy materials required for shareholder
vote on the merger.2 9 In order to win SEC approval of its acquisi-
23. Id. Though the policy statement was meant to be a guideline and not a re-
quirement, it was sent to every bank and thrift. Id.
24. Olaf de Senerpont Domis, GAO Recommends that a Norm Be Set For Banks
Establishing Loss Reserves, AM. BANKER, Nov. 7, 1994, at 3. After a study of twelve
banks with assets over $1 billion, the GAO reported: "Investors, creditors, deposi-
tors, regulators, or other financial report users [are not] able to meaningfully com-
pare the institutions' reserves in judging their adequacy and the quality of the institu-
tions' loan portfolio." Id. The twelve banks' methods for establishing loss reserves
were quite diverse. Id. To arrive at loss rates, some reached back only twelve
months and others several years. Id. The GAO reported that for seven of the twelve
banks, over 30% of total loan-loss reserves were "supplemental reserves not sup-
ported by evidence showing the losses to be likely and reasonably estimated." Id.
The reserve account at one bank was $612 million in excess of what was deemed ap-
propriate by its own portfolio analysis. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. David Weidner & Niamh Ring, Earnings Management Found In All Busi-
nesses, SEC Chief Says, AM. BANKER, Nov. 9, 1998, at 38. The SEC had focused on
SunTrust's loan-loss reserve practices as part of a broader crackdown on earnings
management in banking and other industries. Gillam, supra note 10, at 5.
28. Weidner & Ring, supra note 27, at 1. Speaking against earnings management,
SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, described the process of manipulating earnings using
loan-loss accounts by stating, "A third illusion played by some companies is using un-
realistic assumptions to estimate liabilities for such items as sales returns, loan losses
or warranty costs. In doing so, they stash accruals in cookie jars during the good
times and reach into them when needed in the bad times." The Numbers Game, su-
pra note 8, at 16.
29. Gillam, supra note 10, at 4.
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tion of Crestar, SunTrust agreed to reduce its loan-loss reserves by
$100 million.3' The SEC claimed its stance was aimed at ensuring
consistent loan-loss accounting methodologies and denied harbor-
ing a desire to force all banks to lower their reserve levels.31
Banking regulators and industry insiders quickly mobilized
to criticize the SEC's action against SunTrust and the inherent
message the SEC sent to the industry.32 Financial analysts and
bankers voiced concern that banks might feel pressure to decrease
protection against loan-losses during a period of economic uncer-
tainty.33 Banking regulators also faulted the SEC for making an
example of SunTrust before providing clear methods for adding to
loan-loss reserves without violating securities laws.34 While Sun-
Trust officials apparently believed they were following the rules,
the SEC disagreed.3 ' The SunTrust accusations set the stage for a
monumental debate between banking and accounting regulators
over the proper accounting for banks' loan-loss reserves.36
In November 1998, in the wake of the SunTrust merger, the
SEC and the banking regulators agreed to work together on ques-
tions related to loan-loss reserves.37 The two sides reached an
30. Id. SunTrust's reserves were restated by $25 million in 1994; $35 million in
1995; and $40 million in 1996. Id. at 5. The 13% cut in reserves decreased total re-
serves from $766 million to $666 million leading to an increase in after-tax net income
of $61 million over the three year period. Id.
31. Id. at 4. "We clearly don't want to send the wrong message," explained Lynn
E. Turner, the SEC's chief accountant. "We don't want all the banks reducing their
reserves. Our message is we want people to make sure they've gone through a meth-
odology that is consistent with the guidance out there." Id.
32. Id. "This hurts the industry and I don't think it was necessary," argued Sally
Pope Davis of Goldman, Sachs & Co." Id. "Banks need strong capital positions and
strong reserve positions," stated Richard Spillenkothen, the Federal Reserve Board's
director of banking supervision and regulation." Id. Nancy A. Bush, an analyst with
Ryan, Beck & Co. stated, "Everybody is concerned about the larger issue that the
SEC is doing something that is completely counter to conservative practices in banks.
It's insanity. The SEC can stick to its guns, but it's going to wreak havoc on what the
regulators want to see in the banking industry." Id. at 5.
33. Id.
34. Id. Donna J. Fisher, director of tax and accounting at the American Bankers
Association, stated, "Banks believe they are following the accounting rules. If they
are not, then we need some type of instruction of how to change our practices." Id.
35. Gillam, supra note 10, at 4. SunTrust's chief financial officer claimed, "We
thought we had been following the rules all along and still believe we have been and
are." Id.
36. Id.
37. Rob Garver, Severe Curbs Urged On Loan-Loss Reserves, AM. BANKER, July
2001] 323
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agreement in March 1999, whereby the SEC agreed not to require
banks to restate reserves the way it instructed SunTrust, and the
bank regulators pledged to improve disclosure methods.3 8 How-
ever, in May 1999, this agreement fell through because of SEC
endorsement of a FASB article39 calling for banks to reserve only
for specific problem loans.4"
IH. CURRENT DEBATE
Presently, the debate over how to account for banks' loan-
loss reserves is causing a rift between accounting rulemakers
(SEC, FASB, and AICPA) and banking regulators.41 The contro-
versy continues to revolve around an evolving draft proposal by
the AJCPA.42 In March 1999, the AICPA formed a ten-member
task force charged with clarifying current generally accepted ac-
counting principles (GAAP) applicable to banks' loan-loss re-
serves.43 An early version of the proposal was leaked to American
Banker in July 2000." This early version of the draft proposal pre-
10, 2000, at 3 [hereinafter Garver, Severe Curbs Urged].
38. Id.
39. FASB Viewpoints article, Application of FASB Statements 5 and 114 to a
Loan Portfolio, Apr. 12, 1999 (FASB Financial Accounting Research System CD-
ROM, current through Sept. 15,2000).
40. Garver, Severe Curbs Urged, supra note 37, at 3. Banks' loan-loss reserves
fall into two categories: specific reserves and general reserves. Id. Specific reserves
are those that are meant to cover specific, anticipated losses. Id. General reserves
are meant to cover potential but unidentified losses. Id. These general reserves are
at the forefront of the dispute between accounting rulemakers and banking regula-
tors. See id.
41. Steve Burkholder, Accounting: Rift Looming Between Bankers, Rulemakers
On Loan Losses; Roukema Raises Questions, BNA BANKING DAILY, July 14,2000, at
d2 [hereinafter Burkholder, Rift Looming].
42. Id.
43. Garver, Severe Curbs Urged, supra note 37, at 3. The task force was specifi-
cally formed to apply FASB Statement No. 5, which addresses accounting for contin-
gencies, to reserves for pools of loans, and FASB Statement No. 114, which covers
accounting for the impairment of a loan. Id. Martin F. Baumann, a partner in Price-
waterhouseCoopers' insurance practice, is leading the task force composed primarily
of representatives of major accounting firms. Id. David Morris, financial director at
Chase Manhattan Corp., and Randall Black, account administrator with MBNA
Corp., are the only bankers in the group. Id. Also represented on the task force as a
non-voting observer are the Comptroller's Office, the SEC, and the FASB. Id.
44. Id. The AICPA task force responsible for drafting the proposal continues to
hold meetings marked by internal division. Burkholder, Rift Looming, supra note 41,
at d2. The institution's Accounting Standards Executive Committee is not expected
[Vol. 5
2001] ACCOUNTING FOR LOAN-LOSS RESERVES 325
vented reserving against unspecified losses by only allowing banks
to increase reserves after documenting the impairment of a specific
loan.45 Banks would also be required to disclose the specific event
or events causing the impairment of the loan.46 The draft also in-
cluded a proposal requiring banks to state in their financial state-
ments the methods used for identifying and reviewing problem
loans.47 Banks would also have had to include in financial state-
ments disclosures conveying information about banks' loan-loss
reserve accounts, including the balance at the beginning of the pe-
riod; loan-losses charged against income; losses charged against re-
serves, by loan type; recoveries of chargeoffs, by loan type; and the
balance at the end of the period.48
On June 12, 2000, officials of the Federal Reserve Board,
the Office of the Comptroller of Currency, the Office of the Thrift
Supervision, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. requested a
meeting with the AICPA to discuss the proposal.49 The various of-
to complete final work until well into 2001. Id.
45. Garver, Severe Curbs Urged, supra note 37, at 3. The draft states that
"[liosses should not be recognized before it is probable that they have been incurred,
even though it may be probable based on past experience that losses will be incurred
in the future." Id. at 1. Under GAAP, "additional or incremental components do
not qualify for recognition under GAAP and should not be included in the allowance
for loan losses." Id. at 1. The July draft required that banks be allowed to reserve
against loans only when they had been downgraded, in the case of a commercial loan,
or had gone into default, in the case of a consumer loan. Rob Garver, Audit Group
Seen More Flexible on Reserves, AM. BANKER, Dec. 8,2000, at 1.
46. Garver, Severe Curbs Urged, supra note 37, at 3. Specific loss contingencies
triggering loss recognition when found to be probable could include events related to
... collectibility of receivables; obligations related to product war-
ranties and product defects; risk of loss or damage of enterprise
property by fire, explosion, or other hazards; threat of expropria-
tion of assets; pending or threatened litigation; actual or possible
claims and assessments; risk of loss from catastrophes assumed by
property and casualty insurance companies including reinsurance
companies; guarantees of indebtedness to others; obligations of
commercial banks under "standby letters of credit;" or agreements
to repurchase receivables (or the repurchase the related property)
that have been sold.
ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Statements of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 5, § 3 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1975) (FASB Financial Accounting
Research System CD-ROM, current through Sept. 15,2000).
47. Garver, Severe Curbs Urged, supra note 37, at 3.
48. Id. at 1.
49. Rob Garver, Regulators Assail Plan To Limit Loss Reserves, AM. BANKER,
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ficials claimed the proposal would mask institutions' true financial
condition." The bank regulators pointed out that the proposal
would bar banks from holding any unallocated reserves and re-
quire every addition to reserve accounts to be accompanied by
documentation of a specific loss." The banking regulators urged
the task force to reconsider its position, warning, "loss recognition
may be delayed if institutions believe the task force's guidance re-
quires greater certainty of a loss event than is prudent."" The of-
ficials went on to ask the task force to reconsider allowing banks
only to reserve for loans that have been downgraded by the institu-
tion or have gone into default. 3
Criticism from the banking community led the AICPA to
shift away from the use of these triggering events.54 On December
11, 2000 the AICPA's Accounting Standards Executive Commit-
tee (AcSEC) was reportedly "overall supportive" of a plan by the
group's loan-loss task force that would depart from the more strin-
gent requirements released last summer.5 The plan would do
away with mechanical loss recognition triggers and let banks use a
much more flexible standard for proving that a loss had been in-
curred.6 Instead of requiring the identification of specific events
to trigger the impairment of a loan, the task force gives additional
guidance on the proper accounting for contingencies 57 Leading
July 17, 2000, at 1 [hereinafter Garver, Regulators Assail Plan].
50. Id. While the task force's aim is to reduce excessive reserves, the regulators
wrote, "In practice, the guidance is likely to produce loan-loss allowances that are
understated, particularly as the condition of borrowers weakens in periods preceding
an economic turndown." Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. They continued by writing that such indicators "should not be the sole
determinants of loss recognition on loans." Id. The regulators went on the claim that
the banks should continue to be allowed to base loan-loss reserves on such things as
historical evidence and economic factors. Id.
54. Steve Burkholder, Accounting: OCC Accountant Hopeful Rules In 2001 Will
End Debate On Loan Loss Allowances, BNA BANKING DAILY, Nov. 6, 2000, at d4
[hereinafter Burkholder, OCC Accountant].
55. Steve Burkholder, Accounting: AICPA Accounting Rulemakers Progress On
Loan Losses; Bankers Group Pleased, BNA BANKING DAILY, Dec. 13, 2000, at d7
[hereinafter Burkholder, Rulemakers Progress].
56. Id.
57. Id. The guidance related to the application of FASB Statement No. 5 in-
cludes:
326 [Vol. 5
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banking agencies reiterate the continued significance of the loan-
loss reserve accounting debate and are delighted with the latest
developments of the proposal. 8
If the task force's final proposal is approved by the AcSEC,
which has meetings scheduled for February and March of 2001,"9 it
would be forwarded to the FASB, who must give the final ap-
proval for any such rule. The FASB's responsibility is to ensure
that any accounting guidance on loan-loss allowances is congruent
with statements of GAAP.61 Primarily, in the case of loan-loss re-
serves, FASB Statement No. 5 (on accounting for loss contingen-
cies) and FASB Statement No. 114 (on creditors' accounting for
impaired loans) set the GAAP.62 GAAP requires that impairment
[A] requirement that credit losses be measured in relation to the
observable data used to justify the loss recognition decision; the
analysis and corresponding measures having to be "directionally
consistent" with the underlying observable data over time; and the
measurement's reflecting "a consistent perspective" showing ad-
herence to two fundamental principles-period-to-period uniform-
ity of judgment and selection of a best estimate within a range of
possible amounts of probable loss.
Id.
58. Rob Garver, In Brief. Accounting Group to Ease Reserving Plan, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 13, 2000, at 3. Donna J. Fisher, director of tax and accounting for the
American Bankers Association stated, "This issue is critical for the banking industry.
Banks must be permitted to use judgment to establish loan-loss reserves. Significant
improvements have been made over the past few months by the AICPA, and we're
pleased with this progress." Id.
59. Burkholder, Rulemakers Progress, supra note 55, at d7.
60. Garver, Regulators Assail Plan, supra note 49, at 1.
61. Steve Burkholder, Accounting: Bankers Say AICPA Loan Loss Proposal Me-
chanical, Ignores Managers' Judgment, BNA BANKING DAILY, Sept. 13, 2000, at d2
[hereinafter Burkholder, AICPA Proposal]. GAAP are those principles that have a
substantial authoritative support. Donald E. Kieso & Jerry J. Weygandt,
INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 13 (9th ed. 1998). This support comes from a number
of organizations that are instrumental in the development of financial accounting
standards, or GAAP, in the United States, such as the SEC, AICPA, and the FASB.
Id. The SEC is an agency of the federal government that has the broad powers to
prescribe the accounting standards to be employed by companies that fall within its
jurisdiction. Id. The AICPA issues accounting standards through its Committee on
Accounting Procedure and Accounting Principles Board. Id. The FASB establishes
and improves standards of financial accounting and reporting for the guidance and
education of the public. Id. Possibly the most powerful force influencing the devel-
opment of accounting standards are user groups such as within the banking industry.
Id. Not surprisingly, accounting standards are as much a product of political action as
they are of careful logic or empirical findings. Id.
62. Burkholder, AICPA Proposal, supra note 61, at d2. FASB Statement No. 5
defines a contingency "as an existing condition, situation, or set of circumstances in-
327
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of loan receivables be recognized only when it is probable that a
loss has been incurred based on past events and conditions existing
on the balance sheet date.6' Following FASB approval, the pro-
posal would be released for a ninety-day public comment period,
after which a final position would be adopted.64
IV. SEC PERSPECrIVE
The SEC intensified the debate over loan-loss reserves by
mounting its campaign to curb excesses in earnings management. 65
In a 1998 speech, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt warned that the
reporting of corporate earnings has become "a game among mar-
ket participants," and he blamed management's "zeal to satisfy
consensus earnings estimates and project a smooth earnings
path., 66 Levitt claimed the SEC is not attempting to single out the
volving uncertainty as to possible gain (gain contingency) or loss (loss contingency)
to an enterprise that will ultimately be resolved when one or more future events oc-
cur or fail to occur." Donald E. Kieso & Jerry J. Weygandt, INTERMEDIATE
ACCOUNTING 660 (9th ed. 1998) (citing "Accounting for Contingencies," Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 (Stamford, Conn.: FASB, 1975, par. 1.) Situa-
tions involving uncertainty as to a future loss are loss contingencies, Id. When a loss
contingency exists, the FASB uses the terms remote, reasonably possible, and prob-
able to measure the likelihood that the future event or events will confirm the incur-
rence of the loss. Id. An estimated loss should be accrued by a charge to expense
and a liability recorded only if information available before the issuance of the finan-
cial statements shows that it is "probable that a liability has been incurred" and "the
amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated." Id. at 661. Use of the terms prob-
able, reasonably possible, and remote to measure the likelihood of loss contingencies
involves judgment and subjectivity. Id. at 660-61. FASB Statement No. 114 defines a
loan as "a contractual right to receive money on demand or on fixed and determin-
able dates that is recognized as an asset in the creditor's statement of financial posi-
tion." Id. at 727 (citing "Accounting by Creditors for Impairment of a Loan," State-
ment of Financial Accounting Standards No. 114 (Norwalk, Conn.: FASB, May
1993)). "A loan is considered impaired when it is probable, based on current infor-
mation and events, that the creditor will be unable to collect all amounts due (both
principle and interest) according to the contractual terms of the loan." Id. at 727.
When making judgments concerning the probability of collection, creditors should
employ their normal review procedures including examination of "watch lists," regu-
latory reports of examination, and management reports of total loan amounts by bor-
rower. Id.
63. SEC Deputy Chief Accountant Looks At Loan Losses and Derivatives, Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1887 (Nov. 22,2000), at 4.
64. Garver, Regulators Assail Plan, supra note 49, at 1.
65. Burkholder, Loan Loss Reserves, supra note 7, at d4.
66. The Numbers Game, supra note 8, at 14.
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banking industry with its address of earnings management.67 In
fact, earnings management has become standard procedure
throughout corporate America.6 ' The accounting standards that
govern public companies allow flexibility.69 Generally, regulators
cannot stop companies from smoothing earnings as long as the fi-
nancial maneuvering is appropriately disclosed."° However, com-
panies that use non-disclosed tactics to manage earnings force in-
vestors to make buy-and-sell decisions based upon misleading
information. 1
The SEC's main concern is ensuring proper accounting for
loan-loss reserves in order to protect investors.72 Investors should
be able to differentiate institutions with high credit quality from
those whose loan portfolios contain a high percentage of troubled
loans.73 Mr. Levitt defends the SEC's need to protect investors
and argues the agency's actions have been misconstrued.74 The
67. Weidner, supra note 27, at 38.




71. Id. SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt claimed,
If a company fails to provide meaningful disclosure to investors
about where it has been, where it is and where it is going, a damag-
ing pattern ensues. The bond between shareholders and the com-
pany is shaken; investors grow anxious; prices fluctuate for no dis-
cernible reasons; and the trust that is the bedrock of our capital
markets is severely tested.
The Numbers Game, supra note 8, at 14.
72. Burkholder, Accounting: Bankers Say AICPA Loan Loss Proposal Mechani-
cal, Ignores Managers' Judgment, supra note 61, at d2. Under GAAP, receivables
should only be recognized as impaired when the loss is probable based on past events
and conditions. SEC Deputy Chief Accountant Looks At Loan Losses and Deriva-
tives, supra note 63. The allowance for loan-loss should accurately portray the
changes in an institution's credit quality. Id. As credit quality declines, a timely in-
crease should be made to the allowance indicating the loss incurred. Id. An increase
in credit quality would lead to a corresponding decrease to the allowance account.
Id.
73. SEC Deputy Chief Accountant Looks At Loan Losses and Derivatives, supra
note 63. The SEC emphasizes the role of disclosure in giving investors a clear under-
standing of the factors affecting an institution's credit quality and level of loan-loss
allowance. Id. Disclosure should include trends and developments such as decline in
profitability of an industry segment or an increase of loans in economically disadvan-
taged areas triggering additional allowances for loan-losses. Id.
74. Dean Anason, SEC Chief Defends Policy On Loan Reserves Against Attacks
by Senate Panelists, AM. BANKER, Jul. 30, 1999, at 2.
329
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SEC and FASB maintain that barring banks from reserving against
a specific loan and then including it when setting general reserves
represents an effort to clear up policies which already exist.7 5 The
SEC argues for what analyst Ronald I. Mandle of Sanford C.
Bernstein & Co. has called a "pay-as-you-go" approach to loan-
loss reserves.76 The SEC is expected to embrace the AICPA's
draft proposals related to accounting for loan-loss reserves. The
proposal would further the SEC's goal of providing investors
timely and accurate information concerning a bank's fiscal health
by preventing institutions from using large reserve accounts to
maintain steady earnings in bad years.77
V. BANKING REGULATORS' STANCE
Perhaps the SEC has chosen a particularly dangerous time
for its anti-reserve crusade.7 8 Over the last year, banks have been
75. Id. A 1994 GAO study stated:
Large supplemental reserves can mask changes in an institution's
loan portfolio that are critical to understanding its financial condi-
tion. Previously established supplemental reserves can be used to
absorb current increases in estimated losses. In such instances, an
institution can avoid increasing its current loan loss provision and
reserve to reflect the deterioration in the portfolio. In these cases,
neither the institution's current loss provision nor changes in exist-
ing reserves would be reliable indicators of the increased risk in its
loan portfolio. Large supplemental reserves can also overstate risk
by inappropriately hiding improvements in an institution's loan
portfolio.
GEN. Accr. OFF., Depository Institutions' Divergent Loan-Loss Methods Undermine
Usefulness of Financial Reports (Oct. 31, 1994), at 26. The use of unjustified reserves
hampers an investor's ability to ascertain an institution's true level of loss exposure.
Unnecessary reserves also can be used as tools for earnings management further dis-
torting an institution's condition. Id. at 14.
76. Debra Cope, N.Y. Fed Chief Urges Better System for Loan Reserves, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 19, 1999, at 5.
77. Garver, Severe Curbs Urged, supra note 37, at 3.
78. Tick, tick, tick: Worrying Signs at American Banks: A worrying hint about the
quality of bank loans in America, ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 2000, at 90. Allen Sanborn,
president and chief executive officer of the Risk Management Association, remarked,
"Given we have entered an environment where loan losses are beginning to in-
crease ... banks need to be really focused on their portfolios, to make sure that they
are managing them well and that loan-loss reserves are adequate." Garver, Audit
Group Seen More Flexible on Reserves, supra note 45, at 1.
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faced with increasing credit risk within loan portfolios. 9 In the
fourth quarter of 2000, Bank of America suffered a twenty-seven
percent decrease in net income partly because of corporations that
were unable to repay their debt.80 While bad loans seem to be in-
creasing, banks' reserves are at their lowest in thirteen years."
Despite the inherent reduction in profits and SEC disapproval,
many banks have recently added significantly to loan-loss provi-
sions.8 2 Normally, a percentage of "good" loans will go bad when
the economy slumps.8 3 Banking regulators argue further that, in
this era of massive consolidation, banks have no incentive to create
excessive loan-loss reserves when price to earnings ratios and mar-
ket capitalization are critical to a bank's survival.84 Unnecessarily
79. Tick, tick, tick: Worrying Signs at American Banks: A worrying hint about the
quality of bank loans in America, supra note 78, at 90. "Many banks are experiencing
at least some credit quality issues... spurred by a credit decline in the health-care
industry, the volume of poorly rated syndicated loans grew for the second straight
year." Erick Bergquist, Banks from the South Take Group's Stock Same Direction,
AM. BANKER, Oct. 11, 2000, at 24. Although hesitant to send bankers a message
which conflicts with the SEC, Zane Blackburn, chief accountant for the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, admitted banks do need to be well reserved. Weidner,
supra note 27, at 38. Blackburn conceded that reserves are crucial given the decreas-
ing credit quality and inherent loss in today's bank loan portfolios. Id. In the face of
declining credit quality, financial institutions should be especially concerned with the
internal processes and external regulations relevant to loan-loss allowance. SEC
Deputy Chief Accountant Looks At Loan Losses and Derivatives, supra note 63. See
also, John Murchison, Note, Warning Signs From Increases in Non-Performing
Loans, N.C. BANKING INST., 299 (2001) (discussing problems associated with banks'
non-performing loans).
80. Audrey Y. Williams, B of A Profits Slide in 4th Quarter, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Jan. 17, 2001, at D1. Reported net income of $1.39 billion is down from
the $1.90 billion of last year. Id. In the fourth quarter, Bank of America wrote off
$1.08 billion in bad loans, more than twice the $501 million written off the previous
year. Id. Bad loans are expected to continue to increase into 2001 with the utility
crisis in California expected to make an impact. Id.
81. Id. Also, adjusted for the current risk of the bank loans, the reserve-to-loans
ratio is at its lowest in 50 years. Id.
82. Sherer, supra note 20, at C1. Recently, SunTrust Banks Inc. announced that
nonperforming assets increased by $100 million in the third quarter. Coincidentally,
that is exactly the amount the SEC forced the Atlanta banking company to take out
of loan-loss reserves and add back to earnings in 1998. Bush Shows Off Some Bank-
ing Savvy; LaFalce's Challenger Is Working Overtime, AM. BANKER, Oct. 16,2000,, at
5.
83. Id. William J. McDonough states that immediate attention to loan-loss ac-
counting is crucial because, "The time when bankers make dumb loans is a time like
now, when you're in the ninth year of an economic expansion." Cope, supra note 76,
at 5.
84. William M. Issac, Comment: SEC Courts Danger with Anti-Reserve Crusade,
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adding to loan-loss reserves reduces market capitalization, making
it more likely that a bank will be acquired by a competitor." Also,
increasing reserves reduces profits, which disheartens shareholders
and causes a bank's stock price to drop.86
In contrast to the SEC, banking regulators have tradition-
ally felt banks should save for rainy days by adding to reserves
during periods of increased earnings.8 7 The banks and bank regu-
lators object to the evolving AICPA draft proposal to bring banks'
loan-loss reserve accounting in line with GAAP." They have ob-
jected to the proposal, arguing that it would remove management's
judgment from the assessment of the loan portfolio. 89 Eliminating
banks' ability to allow for a range of error in calculating sufficient
reserves may result in inaccurate assessments of institutions' true
conditions.9"
VI. ART VS. SCIENCE
Banking regulators feel that measuring credit risk necessar-
ily involves subjective judgment and cannot be performed using
the rigid, mechanical process favored by the SEC and AICPA task
force.9' Whether loan-loss reserve decisions should be more of a
subjective art or a mechanical science is a theme of the debate be-
tween banking and securities regulators.92 It has often been sug-
gested that the loan-loss process is really an art.93 "Intuitive
AM. BANKER, Apr. 13,1999, at 6.
85. Id.
86. Tick, tick, tick. Worrying Signs at American Banks: A worrying hint about the
quality of bank loans in America, supra note 78, at 90. In June 2000, the conservative
North Carolina bank of Wachovia announced a $200 million charge against earnings
to boost its loan-loss reserves which caused its stock price to sink. Sherer, supra note
20, at C1.
87. Cope, supra note 76, at 5.
88. Rob Garver, Accounting Board to Test Softer 'Goodwill' Plan, AM. BANKER,




92. Cope, supra note 76, at 5.
93. Garver, Accounting Board, supra note 88, at 4. Tim Journy, executive vice
president and controller of Compass Bank in Birmingham, Alabama, claims, "The
loan-loss process is really an art, and it has a lot of imperfections. Id. But the task
force document has turned it into a mechanical process, eliminating management
332 [Vol. 5
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knowledge" based on experience at the bank and familiarity with
loan customers is arguably more useful in deciding appropriate
loan-loss reserve levels than sophisticated number crunching.94
For instance, community bank officers often have customer infor-
mation, such as a job loss or divorce, that is relevant to their banks'
loan portfolio. 95 FASB Statement No. 114 suggests that creditors
should consider all available information when evaluating poten-
tial loan-losses.96 This includes "environmental" factors relevant
to the collectibility of specific loans.g? Conversely, the SEC appar-
ently believes reserves can be calculated with nearly mathematical
certainty, and that there is little room for judgment by seasoned
bankers and their regulators. 8
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan insists bank
management must account for its own risk assessments.99 A FASB
project manager claims establishing loan-loss reserves is unavoid-
ably subjective, and that it would be impractical to require a single,
objective method to fit all institutions.1"0 Some suggest that be-
judgment." Id.
94. Burkholder, AICPA Proposal, supra note 61, at d2.
95. Id.
96. ACCOUNTING BY CREDITORS FOR IMPAIRMENT OF A LOAN, Statements of Fi-
nancial Accounting Standards No. 114 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1993)
(FASB Financial Accounting Research System CD-ROM, current through Sept. 15,
2000).
97. Id. Environmental factors would include existi ng industry, geographical,
economic, and political factors that are relevant to collectibility of a loan such as de-
creasing profits in a specific industry or an increasing number of loans made in eco-
nomically disadvantaged communities. Id.
98. Issac, supra note 84, at 6.
99. Dean Anason, In Brief: Greenspan Criticizes Loan-Loss Proposal, AM.
BANKER, Jul. 26,2000, at 4. Greenspan comments:
The criteria that are being set up for the purposes of making a
judgment as to when a generic reserve can be put in place is far too
high a barrier, and indeed it tends to mechanize what is a very so-
phisticated banking procedure. The one thing that banking is all
about is judging future losses.. .You are going to make loans
which fail, which are not repaid. You don't know which they are,
or obviously you wouldn't make them. You have a general sense
of what is out there. What differentiates good from bad bankers is
those whose can do that. It strikes me that to inhibit that particu-
lar characteristic from being reflected on the books of the bank is a
mistake.
Id.
100. Domis, supra note 4, at 3. Janet Danola stressed, "Implicit in determining
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cause all banks differ with regard to their risk profile, there is no
one-size-fits-all solution to setting loan-loss reserves.' 0' William J.
McDonough, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, emphasized that bankers must be able to use their individual
judgment when making reserve decisions. 2 He insisted the bur-
den must be on the banks to establish a paper trail showing a
method for arriving at appropriate reserve levels.'0 3
Smaller banks serving small communities are especially
concerned about restrictions on independent judgment in the loan-
loss allowance process." Such restrictions could present an undue
burden on smaller banks with fewer and less complex loans.'
Community bankers assert that federal banking regulators are
"overstepping their bounds" by attempting to interpret GAAP re-
lated to loan-loss allowances. 10 6  They criticize a September 7,
loan-loss reserves is a lot of judgment. If we took away that judgment, loan-loss re-
serves may not accurately reflect the loan losses of the individual institution." Id.
101. Cope, supra note 76, at 5.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Adam Wasch, Bank Supervision: Regulatory Proposal On Loan Reserves
Threatens Independent Judgment, Banks Say, BNA BANKING DAILY, Nov. 8, 2000, at
d3. Dale J. Torpey, Chairman of the Independent Community Bankers of America
Lending Committee (ICBA), stated, community bankers "are not looking to manage
earnings, only anticipate losses that they know from experience will be recognized.
This is particularly important for agricultural banks due to the cyclical nature of the
agriculture industry and to small banks serving small communities that have one
dominant company or industry." Id. Torpey went on to mention the difficulty that
small banks have in diversifying their loan portfolios and mitigating exposure to cy-
cles. Id.
105. Id. In an effort to differentiate between large and small banks, Dale J. Tor-
pey, Chairman of the Independent Community Bankers of America Lending Com-
mittee (ICBA), pointed out,
Smaller institutions with fewer and less complex loans may need
less exhaustive supporting documentation for the ALLL [allow-
ance for loan and lease losses] than will larger institutions. The
ICBA strongly supports this guidance for smaller institutions and
their examiners. Clearly, institutions with large and complex loan
portfolios will need to undertake much greater analysis to deter-
mine the appropriate ALLL for their institution and provide more
documentation of that analysis, than will small institutions with a
small portfolio of loans that are not complex.
Id.
106. Steve Burkholder, Accounting: Community Bankers Concerned Regulators
'Overstepping Bounds' On Loan Loss Rules, BNA BANKING DAILY, Dec. 4, 2000, at
d4.
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2000, interpretive policy statement by the Federal Financial Insti-
tutions Examination Council (FFIEC) proposing accounting and
disclosure methods for loan-loss reserve accounts.1"7 The Amer-
ica's Community Bankers (ACB) claimed justifying their use of
subjective judgment and experience would require "a dispropor-
tionately heavy burden of proof."10 8
VII. POLITICAL REACrION AND PUBLIC POLICY
The political arena has also commented on the loan-loss re-
serves.10 9 Rep. Marge Roukema (R-NJ.), head of the House
Banking Financial Institutions Subcommittee, wrote to the chair-
man of the SEC and the FASB stating her disapproval of the al-
leged proposals."0 She voiced concerns related to safety and
soundness.1 1' She also emphasized the importance of an individual
bank's subjective judgment when it establishes reserves.112 In July
1999, Senators Chuck Hagel, (R-Neb.), and Charles E. Schumer,
(D-N.Y.), urged Senate Banking Committee Chairman Phil
107. Id. The FFIEC is composed of the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comp-
troller of Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift
Supervision, and the National Credit Union Administration. Id.
108. Id. The letter states:
ACB strongly objects, however, to the costly administrative bur-
den that implementation of the proposed methodology and valida-
tion requirements would impose on community banks. Although
the proposed policy statement does provide that 'appropriate' ad-
aptation of these requirements should be permitted based on the
size and complexity of the institution, insufficient guidance is pro-
vided with respect to what adaptations can be made and what
kinds of institutions are eligible to make them.
Id.
109. Barbara A. Rehm, Senators Want to Curb SEC's Power Over Reserves, AM.
BANKER, Jul. 22, 1999, at 2 [hereinafter Rehm, Senators Want to Curb].
110. Burkholder, Rift Looming, supra note 41, at d2. Roukema stated, "I under-
stand the critical importance of institutions' compliance with standard accounting
rules, especially for publicly traded companies. However, I am concerned that cer-
tain aspects of the AICPA proposal could have important safety and soundness im-
plications." Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. Roukema continued, "Any forthcoming accounting guidance should in no
way harm the ability of bank management and the bank's primary regulator to use
their best judgment when determining the appropriate level of loan-loss reserves,
consistent with sensible accounting standards." Id.
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Gramm (R-Tex.) to accept an amendment to the House financial
reform bill that would make the SEC's voluntary consultation with
bank regulators mandatory."' In addition, Republican senators
criticized SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt's crusade to lower banks'
loan-loss reserves."' In response, Levitt defended the SEC's duty
to provide accurate financial earnings data to investors. 5 Fur-
thermore, Levitt reaffirmed SEC commitment to confer with
banking agencies, but opposed legislation mandating coopera-
tion." 6 He spoke of an agreement indicating that the SEC would
speak with a bank's supervisor before insisting that the bank re-
state its reserves.
117
The banking agencies warned Congress that loan-loss re-
serves protect against unexpected losses from bad loans.' They
argued to congressional leaders that decreasing reserve accounts
"could have a profound effect on the continued safety and sound-
ness of America's banking system and would not, in [their] judg-
ment, be in the best interests of American taxpayers, the bank in-
surance funds, or shareholders.""' 9 Maintaining a strong level of
reserves helps prevent banks from failing by allowing them to off-
set losses in troubled times.
20
113. Rehm, Senators Want to Curb, supra note 109, at 2.
114. Anason, supra note 74, at 2. "While the SEC has publicly stated that they are
not trying to require reductions in loan-loss reserves, the implication still exists that
they are," said Senator Rod Grams, chairman of the Senate Banking's securities sub-
committee. Id. "This mixed signal is confusing to regulators, auditors, and bankers
and is simply unacceptable." Id.
115. Id. "The SEC does not want, nor has it ever wanted, financial institutions to
artificially lower loan-loss allowances or ever have inadequate allowances," said
Levitt. Id. "The banking regulators agree that there is no reason why a financial in-
stitution can't have a prudent estimate of loan losses while, at the same time, reflect-
ing management's judgment on the quality of that portfolio to the marketplace." Id.
116. Id. "It is very important that there be no doubt whatsoever as to our com-
mitment to confer when appropriate with.. .the banking agencies," said Mr. Levitt.
Id. "That commitment is and will be absolute." Id
117. Id.
118. Garver, Severe Curbs Urged, supra note 37, at 3.
119. Id.
120. Eugene Ludwig, Viewpoints: Plan to Restrict Reserving Is a Nightmare,
Ludwig Says, AM. BANKER, Dec. 1, 2000, at 14. Ludwig points to bank failures of the
early 1990s as evidence of the importance of holding adequate reserves. Id. He criti-
cizes early versions of the AICPA's draft proposal for not allowing banks to add to
reserves unless the entire amount can be matched to a specific event, which causes
impairment. Id. He argues that losses from individual loans cannot be predicted
with such precision. Id. Ludwig asserts that judgment and experience are crucial for
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The creation of more accurate models for assessing the im-
pairment of loan portfolios serves as a potential arena for com-
promise between banking and accounting groups.12 1 Better models
would aid in banks' efforts in setting accurate reserve levels while
also satisfying the AICPA's request for strict accounting.122  Such
models could satisfy the SEC's desire for a more disciplined meth-
odology while allowing banks a certain level of subjective auton-
omy.1 23 Perhaps the most important tool for resolving the debate
of loan-loss accounting is continued consultation between banking
and accounting regulators. 4  Current accounting guidelines for
setting loan-loss reserves are subject to differing interpretation.
12 1
Consequently, John W. Spiegel, SunTrust's chief financial officer,
pointed out that it is imperative for the industry, banking regula-
tors, and the SEC to come to a common understanding of how to
account for loan-losses.126 SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt mirrored
this sentiment when he acknowledged a need for banking and se-
curities regulators to define "a structure to protect investors and
maintain the integrity of our markets."
1 27
Any debate over banks' accounting for loan-loss reserves
must occur with one eye on the issue of fair value accounting.
128
successful management of credit risk. Id.
121. Garver, Accounting Board, supra note 88, at 4.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Burkholder, OCC Accountant, supra note 54, at d4. The Office of Comptrol-
ler of Currency's chief accountant, Zane Blackburn, speaks positively about the
process to date, saying that banking regulators "keep in close contact with the SEC"
and the interchange has been "very good." Id. Blackburn mentioned that the Gram-
Leach-Bliley Act mandates such consultation between banking regulators and the
SEC. Id.
125. Gillam, supra note 10, at 5.
126. Id.
127. Weidner, supra note 27, at 38. Citing a well established relationship with
banking regulators, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt claimed that the SEC did not "in-
tend to come down unilaterally with a pronouncement without working very closely
with banking regulators." Id.
128. Garver, Accounting Board, supra note 88, at 4. "Fair value represents the
price a buyer would pay for an asset on the current market." Id. Currently, banks
use cost-accounting to value many of their assets at the price actually paid for the as-
set. Id.
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As soon as 2002, banks and other financial institutions may be
forced to value all financial assets at current market value.29
Eventually, entire loan portfolios at every financial institution
would have to be marked to market.13 Banks that have failed to
set aside sufficient reserves would write-off their capital as they
begin this process.' Fair value accounting would replace the cur-
rent system of assigning reserves to cover potential loan losses.
3 2
Instead, "changes in the value of loans would pass through quar-
terly income statements as profits and losses.' ' 3 3 Accounting regu-
lators are of the opinion that fair value accounting is a more accu-
rate method of tracking value than cost accounting. 34 However,
bankers are leery of mandating fair value accounting methods be-
fore coming to terms with the many implementation issues in-
volved. 35 Bankers, loan traders, investors, banking regulators, and
accounting-standard setters disagree on the final impact of fair
value accounting. 136 Perhaps its arrival would mark the only realis-
tic end to the debate over setting appropriate reserve levels.
JONATHAN C. WINDHAM





The changes could introduce far more volatility into income statements, particularly
for financial institutions whose loan portfolios will fluctuate from quarter to quarter,
but also for many other types of corporAtions, because the value of a company's own
loans and bonds may have to be marked to market. This could also make for big
moves in stock prices at earnings time, as investors digest the fluctuating loan values.
Id.
134. Id.
135. Sherer, supra note 20, at C1.
136. Id.
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